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I. Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-Commonwealth v. Clay-
ton, 684 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a regulation creating an irrebuttable presump-
tion that an individual suffering one epileptic seizure is incompe-
tent to operate a motor vehicle violates due process.
In Commonwealth v. Clayton,' David A. Clayton, Sr. suffered
an epileptic seizure in September of 1986.2 Pursuant to statu-
tory mandate, Clayton's treating physician filed a "convulsive
disorder form" with the Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion, informing the Bureau of Driver Licensing that Clayton had
suffered a single seizure and that the drug Dilatin had been pre-
scribed as treatment.3 Additionally, Clayton's physician indi-
cated on the form that Clayton was competent to safely operate
an automobile.4 Nevertheless, the Department of Transportation
suspended Clayton's driving privileges for one year, concluding
Clayton was incompetent to drive under authority of 67 Pa. Code
§ 83.4 ("Section 83.4").
5
Clayton filed a statutory appeal of this determination in the
court of common pleas, arguing that the irrebuttable presump-
tion created by Section 83.4 deprived him of his driving privi-
leges without due process of law.6 The trial court ruled in favor
of Clayton, finding the Department of Transportation's suspen-
sion of Clayton's operating privileges offensive to procedural due
process and, thus, constitutionally infirm.7 The Pennsylvania
1. 684 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1996).
2. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1060.
3. Id. at 1060-61. Physicians and others authorized to treat certain enumerated
medical conditions are required to submit a written report containing the name, date of
birth and address of their patients to the Department of Transportation within ten days
of diagnosis. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1518(b) (1995).
4. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1061.
5. Id. The interplay of two statutory sections and a regulation promulgated
thereunder resulted in Clayton's loss of driving privileges. Id. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1517
(1995) directs a medical advisory board to craft regulations outlining the requisite physi-
cal and mental standards necessary for an individual to lawfully operate a motor vehicle.
67 Pa. Code § 83.4 (1996), a regulation written pursuant to 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1517
(1995), requires that individuals suffering from epilepsy must not have suffered a seizure
for at least one year in order to obtain or maintain driving privileges. Finally, 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1519(c) (1995) directs the Department of Transportation to recall the driv-
ing privileges of any individual deemed incompetent to operate a motor vehicle.
6. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1061. Clayton's appeal to the court of common pleas was
valid pursuant to 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1550 (1995).
7. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1062. Procedural due process ensures that citizens are
afforded the protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
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Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
the case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8
The issue considered by the supreme court was whether Sec-
tion 83.4, which presumed a licensee's incompetence and sus-
pended a licensee's motor vehicle operating privileges for one
year following a single epileptic seizure, was valid when the
licensee was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to rebut the
presumed incompetence. 9 The court commenced its analysis by
acknowledging that Section 83.4 created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption and, thus, the court was able to narrow its focus to con-
sidering the constitutional validity of irrebuttable
presumptions. 10 The court recognized a line of United States
Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1970's concerning
the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine" as valid precedent.1" In
particular, the court found the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Bell v. Burson 2 directly analogous to the present sit-
uation.13 The court noted that in Bell, the Supreme Court found
a Georgia statute removing the operating privileges of uninsured
motorists unable to post security to cover the amount of claimed
damages following an accident to violate procedural due process
because the motorists were not permitted to challenge their lia-
bility at a statutory hearing. 14 Applying the Bell analysis to the
present case, the court concluded that although Pennsylvania
motorists were permitted a hearing before the court of common
pleas under Section 83.4, the hearing was not "meaningful" for
due process purposes because of the irrebuttable presumption of
United States Constitution prior to being deprived of life, liberty or property. BLAcK's
LAW DICIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1062. At the time of the final appeal to the supreme court,
Clayton had long since had his driving privileges reinstated as he had not experienced a
seizure for several years. Id. Ostensibly because Clayton no longer had a stake in the
outcome of the litigation, he chose not to participate in the appeal to the supreme court.
Id. at 1062 n.3.
9. Id. at 1060.
10. Id. at 1062.
11. Id. at 1063-65. Although the supreme court ultimately affirmed the decision of
the commonwealth court, Justice Cappy, writing for the supreme court, found error in the
commonwealth court's reasoning and application of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989). Id. at 1062-64. Specifically, the supreme court found the commonwealth court's
apparent limitation of any analysis of irrebuttable presumptions to procedural due pro-
cess concerns to be in error. Id. at 1062. The court stated: "[WMe find the Commonwealth
Court's limitation of its discussion as to the precise due process principle at issue under
this doctrine to be not only unnecessary but also ill advised." Id. at 1064.
12. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
13. Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1064.
14. Id. at 1065. The court quoted two passages from Bell, in which the United
States Supreme Court concluded that: (1) licensee's are entitled to procedural due pro-
cess; and (2) due process requires a "meaningful" hearing. Id. at 1064-65.
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incompetence to drive. 15 Therefore, the court held Section 83.4
unconstitutional as it violated procedural due process.
1 6
Justice Zappala wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his view
that the significant risk of harm posed to the public by drivers
prone to epileptic seizure rendered Section 83.4 constitutionally
permissible.
17
CONsTITUTioNAL LAw-SEPARATION OF PowERs-Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Erie County v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 682 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission from deciding a
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act discrimination claim filed by a
juvenile probation officer employed by the common pleas court.
In Court of Common Pleas of Erie County v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n,18 the Chief Probation Officer of the
Court of Common Pleas of Erie County ("Erie County") fired juve-
nile probation officer Gary Ison ("Ison") after Ison allegedly made
sexual advances toward a probationer's mother.'9 Ison then filed
a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission
(the "PHRC") against Erie County, alleging that he was termi-
nated because of his race in violation of the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Act (the "PHRA). 2 ° Erie County filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the basis that PHRC lacked jurisdiction over
the matter since Erie County has sole discretion under the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine with regard to terminating its
employees.2 '
15. Id. The court stated:
[It cannot be gainsaid that any 'meaningful' opportunity to be heard would here
require that the licensee be permitted to present objections, not to the conclusion
that he had suffered an epileptic seizure, but rather to the presumption of incompe-
tency to drive.... While Appellee indeed had a forum in which to assert his claim
that he was competent to drive, that forum was rendered meaningless as a result of
the irrebuttable presumption of § 83.4(a) since under that regulation, the recall of
Appellee's license was a foregone conclusion.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1066-67 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
18. 682 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1996).
19. Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1246.
20. Id. The PHRA is set forth at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1997).
21. Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1247.
810
1997 PA Recent Developments-Constitutional Law 811
The PHRC denied the motion and the county appealed the
decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.22 The com-
monwealth court reversed the decision of the PHRC, holding that
the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the PHRC from inter-
fering with the judicial function of terminating court employ-
ees. 23 The case was then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
2 4
The supreme court first noted that under the separation of
powers doctrine, the legislature may not exercise any power that
has been constitutionally granted to the judiciary.25 The court
also stated that since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
granted supervisory and administrative authority over state
courts under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court may find
any act of the legislature that infringes upon the supreme court's
authority over state courts invalid.26
The court held that allowing the PHRC to review court person-
nel decisions would encroach on the authority delegated to the
judiciary by the state constitution.27 The court stated that the
judiciary must maintain this authority so that it is free to select
those individuals for employment who will successfully serve in
judicial proceedings and assist judges in the performance of their
judicial functions.28
The PHRC contended that since Ison was not a "confidential"
employee, 2" the PHRC could hear Ison's claim without violating





26. Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1247. Article V, Section 10 (a) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing prac-
tice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers
serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of
the peace... and the administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of
the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the
rights of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice
of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute or limitation or repose.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (a).
27. Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1248.
28. Id.
29. A confidential employee is defined by the Public Employee Relations Act as:
"[A]ny employe who works: (i) in the personnel offices of a public employer and has access
to information subject to use by the public employer in collective bargaining; or (ii) in a
close continuing relationship with public officers or representatives associated with col-
lective bargaining on behalf of the employer." PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.301(13) (West
1991).
30. Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1248.
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ever, and held that unlike the Public Employee Relations Act,
the PHRA does not distinguish between confidential and non-
confidential employees. 3 1 Thus, the court concluded that under
the separation of powers doctrine, the PHRC is not entitled to
hear a discharged court employee's discrimination claim brought
pursuant to the PHRA. 2
II. Governmental Immunity
GovERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITIcAL SUBDM1SION TORT CLAIS
ACT-Potter v. Springfield Township, 681 A.2d 241 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that
municipal officials acting as trustees of a police officer pension
fund are entitled to governmental immunity from police officers'
claims of breach of fiduciary duty.
In Potter v. Springfield Township,33 the appellants, Springfield
Township police officers and members of the Township Police
Pension Trust and Fund ("Pension Fund"), filed .a complaint in
mandamus' seeking to compel the Pension Fund Trustees
("Trustees") to refund money stolen by the Pension Fund Admin-
istrator. 5 The complaint asserted that the Trustees failed to
make reasonable and prudent efforts to ensure that the Pension
Fund was adequately and soundly managed.36 The Trustees filed
preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting governmental
immunity as a defense. 37 The Court of Common Pleas of Mont-
gomery County subsequently sustained the Trustees' prelimi-
nary objections and dismissed the complaint .3
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court first
addressed whether the Trustees were entitled to governmental
31. Id. at 1249.
32. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Zappala argued that the PHRA should pre-
sumably apply to actions brought by court personnel unless doing so would "clearly, pal-
pably and plainly" violate the constitution. Id. at 1249-50 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
33. 681 A.2d 241 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1996).
34. A writ of mandamus is a writ that issues from a court of superior jurisdiction
directing an executive, administrative or judicial officer to perform a duty imposed by
law. BLAcK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
35. Potter, 681 A.2d at 242. The Pension Fund Administrator stole over $1.4 mil-
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immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the
"Tort Claims Act").39 The court found that the Trustees were
immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act for any dam-
ages resulting from injuries caused by the Pension Fund Admin-
istrator unless: (1) the damages were recoverable against a
defendant who did not have an immunity defense; or (2) the
injury was caused by the negligent acts of the Pension Fund
Administrator.40 The court then held that since the complaint
alleged damages resulting from theft of monies and not negligent
conduct, the Trustees were immune from liability for the Pension
Fund Administrator's willful criminal conduct.41
The court next addressed the police officers' contention that if
the Tort Claims Act applied to this case, the case fell within the
exception for injury to personal property within the care, custody
or control of the political subdivision set forth in section 8542(b)
of the Act.' The court disagreed with this contention, holding
that this exception requires the conditions set forth in both sec-
tions 8542(a) and (b) of the Torts Claims Act to be met before
liability will be imposed.43 Based on its earlier conclusion that
the conditions of subsection (a) had not been met, the court held
that the action did not fall within the exception. 44 Finally, the
court held that the remedy of mandamus is only authorized when
a municipality fails to comply with the applicable standards for
39. Id. According to the Tort Claims Act, political subdivisions are immune from
liability "for any damages which result from any injury to a person or property caused by
any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8541 (1995). A local agency will be liable under the Act, however, if both of the
following conditions are met: (1) damages would be recoverable under common law or a
statute creating a cause of action against an individual without an immunity defense;
and (2) the injury occurred as a result of the negligence of the local agency or an employee
of the local agency acting within the scope of his or her employment. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8542(a) (1995).
40. Potter, 681 A.2d at 243. The court noted that "negligent acts" as defined in the
Act do not include "acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice
or willful misconduct.- Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. This exception provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Acts which may impose liability. The following acts by a local agency or any of
its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency:
(2) Care, custody or control of personal property. The care, custody or control of
personal property of others in the possession or control of the local agency. The
only losses for which damages shall be recoverable under this paragraph are those
property losses suffered with respect to the personal property in the possession or
control of the local agency.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b) (1995).
43. Potter, 681 A.2d at 243.
44. Id. The court also noted that the police officers' complaint failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish "that the Pension Fund was personal property and that [the Trust-
ees'] care, custody or control of such property caused [the police officers'] injuries." Id.
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funding a pension plan and cannot be used simply to compel
Trustees to make restitution for monies stolen by a third party.45
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDISION TORT CLAIMS
ACT-RECREATION USE OF LAND AND WATER ACT-Wilkinson v.
Conoy Township, 677 A.2d 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)-The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a township is
absolutely immune from liability for damages resulting from
injuries sustained by a pedestrian in a park under either the
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act or the Recreation Use of
Land and Water Act.
In Wilkinson v. Conoy Township,' Teresa Wilkinson ("Wilkin-
son") suffered personal injuries when she fell while walking
through Conoy Township Park.47 Wilkinson subsequently filed a
complaint against Conoy Township (the "Township"), alleging
that her injuries resulted from the Township's negligence and
recklessness.'8 The complaint also alleged that the Township
failed to adequately warn Wilkinson of a hazardous condition
that she could not have discovered through the use of reasonable
care.
49
The Township filed an answer and new matter in the case
asserting its immunity from suit based on the Recreation Use of
Land and Water Act (the "RULWA"). 50 Shortly thereafter, the
Township filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief in
support of that motion claiming immunity from suit based on
45. Id. at 244. The Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act
authorizes the remedy of mandamus when a municipality fails to meet the applicable
standards for pension plan funding. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 895.306(a) (West Supp.
1997).
46. 677 A.2d 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
47. Wilkinson, 677 A.2d at 876. Wilkinson fell into a hole in the ground caused by
a removed tree trunk and fractured her lower right leg. Id.
48. Id. at 877. Specifically, the complaint alleged that by permitting a hole to exist
on its property, the Township knew or should have known that it created a hazardous
condition posing an unreasonable risk of danger. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The provisions of the RULWA are set forth at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-
1-477-8 (West 1994). The pertinent provision of this statute provides:
An owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge
any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.
(2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a
duty of care is owed.
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to persons or property
caused by an act or omission of such persons.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-4 (West 1994).
Vol. 35:807814
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both RULWA and the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the
"Tort Claims Act").51  The trial court granted the Township's
motion for summary judgment and Wilkinson appealed to the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.52
The commonwealth court focused its inquiry on whether the
Township could be liable for personal injuries occurring on recre-
ational land it owned.53 In holding that the Township could not
be liable for such injuries, the commonwealth court relied on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Lory v. City of Phila-
delphia. A In Lory, the supreme court held that under the
RULWA, a landowner does not owe a duty of care to an individ-
ual invited on the landowner's property for recreational purposes
unless the landowner willfully or maliciously failed to warn the
individual of a dangerous condition on the land.55 The Lory court
then noted that under the Tort Claims Act, a municipality is
immune even from willful or malicious conduct and is liable only
for negligent acts.56 Thus, when the RULWA and Tort Claims
Act are read together, they completely absolve governmental
units from liability for injuries sustained on municipally owned
recreational property.57
Based on the supreme court's decision in Lory, the common-
wealth court in Wilkinson rejected Wilkinson's claim for dam-
ages against the Township.
5 8
51. Wilkinson, 677 A.2d at 877. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
A local agency shall be liable for damages on account of an injury to a person or
property within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the following condi-
tions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the acts set forth in
subsection (b):
(1) The damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a
cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense
of immunity; and
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee
thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the
categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph, "negligent acts" shall
not include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or
willful misconduct.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(a) (1995).
52. Wilkinson, 677 A.2d at 877.
53. Id.
54. Id. See Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996). In Lory, a teen-
ager who had been drinking alcoholic beverages drowned after attempting to swim in a
pond located in a park owned by the City of Philadelphia. Lory, 674 A.2d at 674.
Although signs had been posted prohibiting swimming on numerous occasions in the
past, there were no signs posted on the day of the accident. Id.
55. Lory, 674 A.2d at 675.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wilkinson, 677 A.2d at 879.
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-PoLrnICAL SUBDIVISION TORT CLAIMS
ACT-MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION-Black v. Shrewsbury Bor-
ough, 675 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court held that whether a motorist's flight from police
constitutes a superseding cause sufficient to sever governmental
liability for a car accident occurring during the flight is a ques-
tion reserved for a jury.
In Black v. Shrewsbury Borough,5 9 the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court held that a motorist's flight from police may be con-
duct so unforeseeable and extraordinary as to constitute a
superseding cause, severing governmental liability for injuries
resulting from an automobile accident; however, such flight is
not a superseding cause as a matter of law.60 Municipal defend-
ants are not, therefore, entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
in all cases when a motorist or passenger is injured as a result of
an accident occurring during the motorist's flight from police.6'
In Black, Dwaine and Mickey Black were passengers in a car
operated by Joseph Black during the early morning hours of Sep-
tember 8, 1990.62 Officer James Boddington commenced pursuit
of the Blacks' vehicle and was joined shortly thereafter by Officer
Clarence Morris once it became apparent to Officer Boddington
that the Blacks' vehicle was not going to stop.63 The Blacks' vehi-
cle struck a utility pole following a tumultuous high speed pur-
suit, killing Dwaine Black and severely injuring Mickey and
Joseph Black.
64
Wrongful death and survival actions were brought on behalf of
Dwaine Black and an action for personal injuries was brought by
Mickey Black against various police officers, police departments
and municipalities for injuries sustained as a result of the car
accident.6 The complaint alleged, among other things, that the
59. 675 A.2d 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
60. Black, 675 A.2d at 385.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 382.
63. Id. The court acknowledged the officers had probable cause to believe that
Joseph Black had committed violations of the Vehicle Code prior to commencing pursuit.
Id.
64. Id. The Blacks' complaint alleged that the chase proceeded over dirt roads,
through a cornfield and into the state of Maryland before the Blacks' auto struck the pole.
Id.
65. Black, 675 A.2d at 381, 383. Named defendants in the case included: Officer
James Boddington of the Shrewsbury Police Department, Officer Clarence Morris of the
New Freedom Police Department, Shrewsbury Borough Police Department, New Free-
dom Borough Police Department, Southern Police Department, Shrewsbury Borough and
Freedom Borough. Id. at 381.
816 Vol. 35:807
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officers were negligent and reckless in pursuing the Blacks' vehi-
cle at a high rate of speed over unfamiliar terrain when the
officers were aware of the presence of passengers in the vehicle.
66
All of the various defendants filed preliminary objections to the
complaint asserting immunity from suit under 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 8541 and 8542 (1995).67 The trial court sustained the
defendants' preliminary objections to each count of the complaint
except those counts averring willful misconduct of the police
officers.6
On appeal, the Blacks argued that the trial court erroneously
disposed of their negligence claims particularly in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Drumhel-
ler.69 In Powell, the supreme court considered the potential lia-
bility of the Department of Transportation for negligent road
design when the plaintiff was injured by an intoxicated driver.70
The Powell court concluded that whether the intoxicated driver's
conduct was a superseding cause of the automobile accident was
for the jury to determine.
71
The commonwealth court in Black found the issue to be
whether Joseph Black's criminal ffight from the police was so
extraordinary and egregious as to constitute a superseding cause
of injury and sever any of the defendants' potential liability for
the accident. 72 Although the court recognized a motorist's ffight
may constitute a superseding cause in many circumstances, it
Also existent but not at issue in the present appeal was a claim by the Blacks
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) for violation of their civil rights. Id. at 382 n.1.
66. Id. at 383. Additionally, the complaint alleged willful misconduct by the
officers. Id.
67. Id. Preliminary objections are a procedural device allowing a party to chal-
lenge the validity of a pleading. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 1028. In this instance, the
defendants challenged the complaint under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1028(a)(4), asserting it to be legally insufficient. Black, 675 A.2d at 383.
68. Black, 675 A.2d at 382-83. The court noted that the trial court relied upon
Dickens v. Homer, 611 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1992Xholding that governmental immunity is not
waived when injuries are the result of others' criminal agency). Id. at 383.
69. Id. at 383-84. See Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1995)(holding crim-
inal conduct of third party is not, per se, a superseding cause sufficient to sever a govern-
ment defendant's liability).
70. Powell, 653 A.2d at 620.
71. Id. at 624. The Powell court stated:
Wle do not agree that any violation of a criminal statute constitutes a superseding
cause. Instead, the proper focus is not on the criminal nature of the negligent act,
but instead on whether the act was so extraordinary as not to be reasonably fore-
seeable.... A determination of whether an act is so extraordinary as to constitute
a superseding cause is normally one to be made by the jury.
Id.
72. Black, 675 A.2d at 385. The court stated: "The issue, however, is whether
under the particular circumstances alleged the law says with certainty that Joseph
Black's conduct was the sole legal cause, or stated another way, whether his conduct was
so extraordinary as to amount to a superseding cause of the accident." Id.
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determined that flight alone is not a superseding cause as a mat-
ter of law.73 Significantly, the court concluded the Blacks' flight
did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance and, therefore,
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the Blacks' claims.74
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT CLAIMS
ACT-RECREATION USE OF LAND AND WATER ACT-Lory v. City of
Philadelphia, 674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that operation of the Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act and the Recreation Use of Land and Water Act
precluded recovery for the wrongful death of a teenaged boy who
drowned in a pond located on City of Philadelphia property.
Devil's Pool is a natural pond located in a park owned by the
City of Philadelphia.75 In 1983, a teenaged boy named David
Barr drowned in Devil's Pool.76 On the night David Barr
drowned, signs prohibiting swimming in the pond had been
removed by vandals.77 Similar signs had been posted and
removed on numerous prior occasions. 78 At trial, the plaintiffs
prevailed on wrongful death and survival actions against the
City.79
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, the City
argued it was immune from liability by operation of the Recrea-
tion Use of Land and Water Act 8° (the "RULWA") and the Polit-
ical Subdivision Tort Claims Act 81 (the "PSTCA"). The
commonwealth court disagreed with the City with respect to
73. Id. at 385. The court stated: "The teaching of Powell and Jones is that the
criminal act of flight is not in and of itself conduct so extraordinary as to constitute a
superseding cause as a matter of law." Id.
74. Id.
75. Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 674 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa. 1996). The pond is situated
in a distant portion of the park that has not been developed. Id.
76. Lory, 674 A.2d at 674. David Barr had consumed alcohol on the night he
drowned in the pond. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. At trial, the plaintiffs alleged that the City failed to adequately warn of the
danger of swimming in the pond or to take adequate steps to prohibit swimming in the
pond. Id.
79. Id. Wrongful death is a cause of action created by statute for the beneficiaries
of a decedent against the individual or individuals whose tortious acts caused the death of
the decedent. BLAcis LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990). A survival action is a statu-
tory construct that allows a cause of action by an injured person against certain
tortfeasors to survive the death of the injured person. BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 1446
(6th. ed. 1990).
80. The Recreational Use of Land and Water Act is codified beginning at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 477-1 (West 1994).
81. The PSTCA is codified beginning at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8541 (1995).
Vol. 35:807818
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immunity, however, it granted a new trial on other grounds.8 2
The City appealed the commonwealth court's decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.a
The issue before the supreme court was whether the City was
immune from liability under portions of the RULWA and
PSTCA.8 The court commenced its analysis by examining the
RULWA, noting in particular that the statute only imposes liabil-
ity for "'willful or malicious' failure to guard or warn against dan-
gers" on undeveloped park land. 5 As such, the court concluded
that the City would be immune from liability under the RULWA
unless its acts were "willful or malicious" in nature.
86
Next, the court considered the PSTCA, which abrogates gov-
ernmental immunity with respect to certain "negligent acts."
8 7
Significantly, however, the court acknowledged that the PSTCA
explicitly exempts willful or malicious conduct from considera-
tion as a "negligent act" for purposes of abrogating immunity.Ys
As a result, the "willful or malicious" conduct by the City that
establishes liability under RULWA also forbids abrogation of the
City's immunity under the PSTCA.89 Applying the relevant stat-
utes to the case, the supreme court held that the City was not
liable for its negligence under the RULWA nor its willful or mali-
cious failure to warn of danger under the PSTCA.90 The court
concluded, therefore, the City was immune from liability for
Barr's death and dismissed the action.91
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cappy asserted his disdain for
the "bizarre and unjust" result of the application of the RULWA
and PSTCA to the case, characterizing the statutes as "simply
82. Lory, 674 A.2d at 674. The commonwealth court found the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of prior accidents at other city ponds. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 675. The court focused on PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-3, 477-4, 477-6
(West 1994) in its analysis. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lory, 674 A.2d at 675. Section 8542 of the PSTCA provides, in pertinent part:
"a local agency shall be liable ... if... (1) The damages would be recoverable under
common law or a statute creating a cause of action... and... (2) The injury was caused
by the negligent acts of the local agency." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(a) (1995).
88. Lory, 674 A.2d at 675. Section 8542(a)(2) of the PSTCA sets forth, in pertinent
part: "As used in this paragraph, 'negligent acts' shall not include acts or conduct which
constitutes a crime, actual malice or willful misconduct." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(a)(2)
(1995).
89. Lory, 674 A.2d at 675.
90. Id. The court noted that its interpretation of these statutes is commensurate
with the long standing principle that exceptions to governmental immunity are to be
strictly construed. Id.
91. Id. at 676.
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unconscionable and not in accord with modern trends of
liability. "92
III. Criminal Law
CRIMINAL LAW-DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL-
JURY INSTRUCTION-ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL-Common-
wealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1996). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that a fact-finder may properly be
instructed that a person behind the wheel of a vehicle is in a
position to control the vehicle for purposes of determining
whether he or she is in actual physical control of the vehicle
under Pennsylvania's drunk driving statute.
In Commonwealth v. Wolen, 93 Brenda Patton drove Joseph
Wolen to a local restaurant parking lot believing Wolen to be too
intoxicated to drive.94 After parking in the lot, yet with the vehi-
cle engine still running, Patton exited the vehicle and left Wolen
in the passenger seat.95 A restaurant employee subsequently
contacted the police after noticing the parked vehicle with its
engine running and Wolen asleep in the driver's seat.9" After
arriving on the scene, the police charged Wolen with driving
under the influence of alcohol.97
A jury later convicted Wolen of driving under the influence of
alcohol ("DUI) in violation of Pennsylvania's drunk driving stat-
ute98 and sentenced him to ninety days incarceration and one
year of probation.99 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed
the conviction, and Wolen appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.1°°
92. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring).
93. 685 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1996Xplurality opinion).
94. Wolen, 685 A.2d at 1385. Patton testified at Wolen's subsequent trial that




97. Id. Appellant failed several field sobriety tests and refused to undergo a blood
alcohol test. Id.
98. 75 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3731(aXl) (1995), amended by 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3731(aX1) (Supp. 1996). The statute provided: "A person shall not drive, operate or be
in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle ... while under the influence of
alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving." Id.
99. Wolen, 685 A.2d at 1385.
100. Id.
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On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the trial
court improperly instructed the jury on the meaning of the term
"actual physical control" within the context of Pennsylvania's
drunk driving statute. 10 1 The trial court gave the following
instruction:
If somebody were in the back seat of a car, they would not be in physi-
cal control. If they were in the right front passenger seat, they would
not be in a position to control. If they were in the middle .... there
may be a question as to whether or not that individual would have the
position where they could have access to the instruments that would
control the vehicle. If they were seated in the driver's seat, they would
be in a position to control.'°2
The court determined that the instruction was not improper,
rejecting Wolen's contention that the jury was erroneously
instructed that, as a matter of law, it must find Wolen to have
been in actual physical control of the vehicle by concluding he
was behind the wheel of the vehicle. 103 Rather, the court found
the instruction to be proper since the ultimate conclusion of
whether Wolen had actual physical control of the vehicle was left
to the finder of fact. 104 According to the supreme court, the trial
court merely instructed the jury that a driver behind the wheel of
a vehicle would be in the position to have actual physical control
of such car. 0 5
CRIMINAL LAw-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PRVACY RIGHTs-Com-
monwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1996)-The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in a room of an
abandoned house under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In Commonwealth v. Gordon,0 6 Philadelphia police officer
Frank Pavgouzas ("Officer Pavgouzas") entered an abandoned
house in search of a purse-snatching suspect. 0 7 Upon entering
the kitchen, Officer Pavgouzas observed a sink filled with dirt, no
kitchen appliances and trash littered throughout the room. 08
101. Id. See supra note 98 for the relevant text of the statute.
102. Wolen, 685 A.2d at 1387 (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 1388.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 683 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1996).
107. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 253. An elderly man told Officer Pavgouzas that a man




Officer Pavgouzas then pushed aside a sheet hanging from a
doorway and entered the dining room, where he discovered
Charles Gordon ("Gordon") sitting on a mattress on the floor
watching television.109 A black pocketbook was lying on the floor
next to the mattress. 110 After ordering Gordon to stand up,
Officer Pavgouzas noticed a blue change purse lying on the mat-
tress."' An individual subsequently arriving on the scene identi-
fied Gordon as a thief and the black pocketbook and blue change
purse as her property." 2
Gordon was charged with theft and filed a motion to suppress
the evidence found with him at the abandoned house. 113 The
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied the
motion, holding that neither Gordon's rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution nor Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution were violated by the war-
rantless search of the abandoned house. 114 The trial court
subsequently found Gordon guilty of receiving stolen property,
but acquitted him on the charges of robbery and simple
assault. 115
Gordon filed a post-verdict motion alleging that the warrant-
less search was unconstitutional, but the trial court denied the
motion.116 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed
the common pleas court's denial of Gordon's motion to suppress,
holding the search violated Gordon's right to freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution." 7 The Commonwealth then chal-




110. Id. The only other items in the room were a milk crate, lamp and a "beer ball."
Id.
111. Id.
112. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 253.
113. Id. at 255.
114. Id. at 255-56. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as
follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
115. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 255-56.
116. Id. After denying Gordon's post-conviction motion, a judge sentenced Gordon
to five years probation. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 256.
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On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed
whether Gordon had an expectation of privacy in the abandoned
house by stating that claims of violation of privacy rights under
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are subject
to a two part test.'19 Specifically, in order to succeed on a claim
of violation of privacy rights, a claimant must prove that he or
she: (1) exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the prop-
erty at issue; and (2) demonstrated that the expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and
legitimate.120
The court agreed with Gordon's contention that in this case,
the presence of a sheet in the doorway and the mattress and tele-
vision in the dining room of the abandoned house evidenced
Gordon's subjective expectation of privacy in that room and,
thus, satisfied the first part of the test. 12 ' To satisfy the second
part of the test, however, the court held Gordon must prove he
either had a possessory interest in the room of the abandoned
house or a legitimate presence there, or a reasonable and justi-
fied expectation of privacy in the room discernable from some
other factor. 122 Since Gordon conceded that he had no ownership
interest in the house, and offered no evidence proving he had a
legitimate right to be there, the court considered the totality of
the circumstances in order to decide if some other factor existed
from which society could find Gordon had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the abandoned house.1m
The court held that a legitimate expectation of privacy in prop-
erty is established if a defendant demonstrates certain owner-
ship characteristics. 124  One of the most important
characteristics, the court noted, is the right to exclude others
from the property. 2 5 The court then concluded that in this case,
the sheet in the doorway separating the dining room from the
other rooms simply was not enough to sustain Gordon's burden of
proving his right to exclude others from the abandoned house. 2 6
Thus, the court held the warrantless search of the abandoned
119. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1993)).
120. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 256.
121. Id. at 257-58.
122. Id. at 258.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
125. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 258.
126. Id. The court based its conclusion on the fact that no testimony was offered
establishing that Gordon excluded other people from the dining room or hung the sheet
himself. Id. Furthermore, other evidence revealed the exterior door to the house was
open and unlocked, rendering Gordon's claim that others were excluded from the house
implausible. Id.
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house did not violate Gordon's right to freedom from unreasona-
ble search and seizure under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
127
CRIMINAL LAW-COMPETENCY EXAMINATION-BURDEN OF
PROOF-Commonwealth v. du Pont, 681 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1996)-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant must
prove incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evi-
dence even though a court orders the defendant to satisfy a com-
petency examination.
In Commonwealth v. du Pont,28 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that a defendant must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence his or her incompetency to stand trial when
the court sua sponte'29 orders the defendant to perform a compe-
tency examination. 130 In du Pont, John E. du Pont ("du Pont")
was charged with first degree murder and incarcerated without
bail. 131 Shortly after du Pont's incarceration, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Delaware County ordered a competency examina-
tion to be performed on du Pont after finding a prima facie
question as to du Pont's incompetency existed.132 Subsequently,
du Pont filed an emergency application for relief with the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court requesting a stay of his examination.
133
127. Id. at 259.
128. 681 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1996).
129. A court acting sua sponte is acting on its own will or motion. BLAcK's LAw
DICTIoNARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
130. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1328.
131. Id. du Pont was incarcerated in the Delaware County Prison. Id.
132. Id. Competency examinations of criminal defendants are ordered pursuant to
sections 7402 (d) and (e) of the Pennsylvania Mental Procedures Act, codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (West Supp. 1997).
133. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1329. du Pont asserted that section 7403 (a) of the Penn-
sylvania Mental Procedures Act is unconstitutional based on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996). Id. In Cooper, the Court
held that requiring a criminal defendant to prove his or her incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence violates the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1379.
The Pennsylvania Legislature recently amended section 7403 (a) of the Penn-
sylvania Mental Procedures Act, and the section now reads as follows:
Except for an incompetency examination ordered by the court on its own motion as
provided for in Section 7402 (d), the individual making an application to the court
for an order directing an incompetency examination shall have the burden of estab-
lishing incompetency to proceed by a preponderance of the evidence. The determi-
nation shall be made by the court.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7403(a) (West Supp. 1997). Section 7403 (a) prior to the amend-
ment provided: "The moving party shall have the burden of establishing incompetency to
proceed by clear and convincing evidence. The determination shall be made by the court."
824
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The supreme court held that requiring a criminal defendant to
prove his or her incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance
of the evidence does not violate the due process component of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, even when the court orders the
defendant to undergo a competency examination. 134 The court
referred to Cooper v. Oklahoma 135 in support of its decision, and
also to well established Pennsylvania case law clearly stating
that a criminal defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence his or her incompetency to stand trial.
1 36
The court rejected du Pont's argument that maintaining a pre-
sumption of competency to stand trial is improper if a trial court
finds there is a question as to the defendant's competency. 37 The
court found that a criminal defendant bears the burden of prov-
ing his or her competency to stand trial, regardless of whether
the trial court or the defendant raises the competency issue. 138
CRImiNAL LAw-DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL -
BLOOD ALCOHOL CoNTENT-Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d
162 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
statute imposing criminal penalties on individuals with a blood
alcohol content equal to or in excess of. 10% within three hours of
driving violates the substantive due process guarantees of the
United States Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution.
In Commonwealth v. Barud,' 9 police observed David Barud
operating a motor vehicle in an erratic manner."0 The police
pulled Barud's vehicle off of the road and administered three
field sobriety tests, which Barud failed."' The police then
arrested Barud for driving under the influence of alcohol
Id. Both parties to this case agreed that section 7403 (a) prior to the amendment was, in
fact, rendered unconstitutional by Cooper. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1329.
134. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1330. The court relied on Article I, Section 9 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution as a guarantee of due process. Id. This provision sets forth: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused ... [cannot] be deprived of life, liberty or property
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." PA. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
135. 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
136. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1330. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d 531
(Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Robinson,
431 A.2d 901 (Pa. 1981).
137. du Pont, 681 A.2d at 1330. The court rejected this argument since du Pont
could not provide the court with any authority that would "compel [the court] to carve out
an exception to the preponderance of the evidence burden." Id.
138. Id.
139. 681 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1996).
140. Barud, 681 A.2d at 163.
141. Id.
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("DUI). 142  A blood test performed on Barud approximately
thirty-five minutes after the police stop revealed a blood alcohol
content of 0.15%.143
Barud was indicted for driving under the influence of alcohol
in violation of Pennsylvania law.'" Barud then filed a pre-trial
motion seeking dismissal of the drunk driving charge brought
against him pursuant to section 5 of Pennsylvania's drunk driv-
ing statute. 1 45 Specifically, Barud alleged that this section of the
statute violated the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution.146 The trial court agreed with Barud, and dismissed this
criminal count. 147  The Commonwealth then directly appealed
the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' 4
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion on the ground that section 3731(a)(5) of Pennsylvania's
drunk driving statute "clearly, palpably and plainly" violated
both the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions. 149
Specifically, the court found this section void for vagueness and
overbreadth. 150 The court held the statute to be overbroad
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Barud was charged pursuant to sections 3731(a)(1) and (a)(5) of Penn-
sylvania's drunk driving statute. Id. Section 3731(aX1) provided, in pertinent part, as
follows: "A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the move-
ment of any vehicle: (1) while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders
him incapable of safe driving." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731(a)(1) (1995), amended by 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3731(a)(1) (Supp. 1996). Section 3731 (a)(5) provided:
A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of
any vehicle: (5) if the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is
0.10% or greater at the time of a chemical test of a sample of the person's breath,
blood or urine, which sample is: (i) obtained within three hours after the person
drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731(a)(5) (1995), amended by 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731(a)(5)
(Supp. 1996).
145. Barud, 681 A.2d at 163.
146. Id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in rele-
vant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of the law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend V. Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides: "Nor can an accused be deprived of his life, liberty or property,
unless by a judgment of his peers or the law of the land." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
147. Barud, 681 A.2d at 163.
148. Id. The court's jurisdiction rested upon 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722 (7) (1995),
which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the supreme court over final orders by the
courts of common pleas in any case in which a Pennsylvania statute has been held uncon-
stitutional under the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions. Id. at 163 n.2.
149. Id. The court noted that there is a strong presumption that legislative enact-
ments do not violate the Constitution; therefore, a statute will only be determined uncon-
stitutional if it "clearly, palpably and plainly" violates the Constitution. Id. at 165 (citing
Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1340 (Pa. 1996)).
150. Id. at 165. According to the court, the "void for vagueness doctrine requires
that a penal statute defined the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
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because it required no proof that an individual's blood alcohol
content exceeded the legal limit of .10% at the time of driving.'
15
In addition, the section was void for vagueness because it had the
"effect" of creating substantial confusion as to what blood alcohol
level was specifically prohibited under the Motor Vehicle Code.
152
In conclusion, the court stated that this statute could not be
upheld because, in effect, it imposed absolute liability upon an
accused for driving under the influence of alcohol. 1'5 3 Specifically,
the statutory provision failed to provide any mechanism for the
admission of evidence that an accused's blood alcohol content
was below the legal limit at the time he or she actually operated
the motor vehicle.
5 4
CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-REPROSECUTION FOR SAME
OFFENSE WHEN COURT WITHDRAwS FORMERLY ACCEPTED GUILTY
PLEA PRIOR TO SENTENCINC--Commonwealth v. Rosario, 679
A.2d 756 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the double jeopardy principles embodied in the United
States Constitution, Pennsylvania Constitution and Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code do not prohibit reprosecuting a defendant
for an offense to which the defendant formerly pled guilty when
the court has withdrawn the plea prior to sentencing.
In Commonwealth v. Rosario,'55 Nancy Rosario (the "defend-
ant") and two other individuals were charged with the murder of
Maurice Scott. 156 The defendant subsequently entered a plea of
guilty to the crime of third degree murder, which the trial court
accepted after discussing the plea with the defendant and her
attorney. 57 The defendant's sentencing hearing was postponed
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. (citing Mikulan, 470 A.2d at
1342). A statute is overbroad if "by its reach it punishes constitutionally protected activ-
ity as well as illegal activity." Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114
(1972)).
151. Id.
152. Barud, 681 A.2d at 166.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 167.
155. 679 A.2d 756 (Pa. 1996).
156. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 757. The defendant was specifically charged with criminal
homicide in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 (1995), and criminal conspiracy in
violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (1995). Commonwealth v. Rosario, 613 A.2d 1244
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
157. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 757.
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until after a court-ordered pre-sentence investigation was
completed.
158
Upon evaluating the pre-sentence investigation report, the
trial court noticed that an individual who testified at the defend-
ant's preliminary hearing allegedly witnessed the defendant stab
Maurice Scott repeatedly.159 The court found this testimony to
contradict that given by the defendant at the plea colloquy, at
which time she informed the court she stabbed Mr. Scott one
time."eo As a result, the court ordered the withdrawal of the
defendant's plea, reasoning that the court would have initially
rejected the plea had it been aware of the alleged eyewitness tes-
timony prior to the plea hearing. 161 The Commonwealth subse-
quently filed charges of first and second degree murder against
the defendant for the death of Mr. Scott. 1
62
The defendant appealed the case to the superior court, claim-
ing she could not be further prosecuted for killing Mr. Scott
based on the double jeopardy principles announced in the United
States Constitution, Pennsylvania Constitution and Penn-




161. Id. While the court conceded that the prosecution brought general information
about this eyewitness testimony to the court's attention prior to the defendant's plea col-
loquy, it claimed that the District Attorney's characterization of the testimony as unrelia-
ble caused the court to disregard the information when accepting the guilty plea. Id.
The court stated that '[tihe District Attorney depreciated this evidence in characterizing
the witness as being potentially unreliable due to his history and record without detailing
the particulars of his testimony." Id.
162. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 758.
163. Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, in perti-
nent part: "INlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause of Article 1,
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution sets forth, in pertinent part: "No person
shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code embodies principles of double jeopardy in both sec-
tions 109 and 110. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 109, 110 (1995). Section 109 of the Code
provides:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is
based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(3) The former prosecution resulted in conviction. There is a conviction if the pros-
ecution resulted in ... a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after the first witness was
sworn but before a verdict, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 109(3), (4) (1995). Section 110 of the Code sets forth, in pertinent
part:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than
a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former pros-
ecution under the following circumstances:
828
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according to Commonwealth v. Branch,164 the principles of
double jeopardy attached to her case immediately after the trial
court accepted her plea.
16
The superior court found the defendant's arguments devoid of
merit and affirmed the trial court's decision.166  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court then granted allocatur in the case to
determine whether reprosecuting a defendant for crimes to
which the defendant previously pled guilty violates double jeop-
ardy when the plea has been withdrawn prior to sentencing.1
67
Overruling Branch, the supreme court found that constitu-
tional and state statutory double jeopardy principles do not
attach to a criminal defendant's guilty plea until the moment of
sentencing. 68  Accordingly, a court's pre-sentence order to a
defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilt to a particular
crime subjects the defendant to further prosecution for that same
offense. 6 9 The court reasoned that any other construction of
double jeopardy principles would be at odds with Pennsylvania
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in
Section 109 of this title ... and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first
prosecution.
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 110(1)(i) (1995).
164. 612 A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
165. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 758. In Branch, a defendant charged with multiple crimes
sought to enter several guilty pleas at a plea hearing. Branch, 612 A.2d at 1086. The
trial court allowed the defendant to enter the pleas, but reserved acceptance of the pleas
until after a pre-sentencing report had been completed. Id. at 1087. Following its review
of the pre-sentencing report, the court refused to accepted the guilty pleas. Id. The court
then ordered the state to continue prosecution against the defendant.
On appeal, the superior court held that constitutional double jeopardy principles
attached at the moment a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea. Id. at 1088. The court
concluded that "Itihe entry of a plea of guilty is not only the commencement of the guilt-
determining process, but is, if accepted, a final determination of guilt." Id. (citing Com-
monwealth v. Lewis, 440 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Looking to the facts of Branch,
however, the superior court in Branch found that double jeopardy did not preclude fur-
ther prosecution of the defendant since the trial court never formally accepted his guilty
pleas. Id. at 1088-89.
166. Rosario, 613 A.2d at 1246.
167. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 757-59.
168. Id. at 759. Although the defendant appealed this case based on the state statu-
tory double jeopardy provisions set forth in both sections 109 and 110 of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code, the court found only section 109 applicable to the case. Id. at 758. The
court then noted that according to its holding in this case, under section 109 of the Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code, the wording "'a plea of guilty accepted by the court' refers to a
guilty plea that continues to remain in effect until the imposition of sentence." Id.
The Rosario court recognized that the Branch court discussed only constitutional
double jeopardy principles. Id. at 759. The defendant in Rosario conceded, however, that
the law has never distinguished between constitutional and state statutory double jeop-
ardy principles with respect to when double jeopardy attaches. Id. Thus, Branch is also




Rule of Criminal Procedure 320, as it would, in effect, deny
judges the ability to direct the withdrawal of guilty pleas at any
time prior to sentencing.1 7 0 More specifically, although conclud-
ing that jeopardy principles attach to a guilty plea upon its
acceptance by the court would not actually preclude judges from
ordering withdrawal of a plea before sentencing, such a conclu-
sion would, in practice, cause judges to refrain from ordering
withdrawal since the order would result in prohibiting further
prosecution. 171
CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-APPLICABILITY TO CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT CONVIcTIONs-Commonwealth v. Yerby, 679 A.2d 217
(Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that applica-
tion of the Blockburger test by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Dixon to determinations of whether double
jeopardy forbids subsequent convictions for criminally contemp-
tuous conduct overruled the 1984 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in Commonwealth v. Allen.
On November 1, 1992, Tony Yerby ("Yerby") fired a gun at his
estranged girlfriend, struck her with a gun, choked her and
threatened to kill her despite a court order forbidding Yerby from
"striking, threatening, abusing or harassing" this former girl-
friend. 7 2 As a result, on October 7, 1993, a court convicted Yerby
of criminal contempt for violating a protection order. 73 In addi-
tion to the criminal contempt conviction, a court subsequently
convicted Yerby of terroristic threats and other crimes he com-
170. Id. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 320 provides, in relevant part:
"At any time before sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit or direct a plea of
guilty to be withdrawn and plea of not guilty substituted." PA. R. CRIM. P. 320.
171. Rosario, 679 A.2d at 759 n.2. The court found its holding in this case to also
comport with Section 1.08 of the Model Penal Code, the precursor to Section 109 of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Id. at 759. The Rosario court concluded that based on the
language of this Model Penal Code section, "the drafters of the... Code clearly premised
the bar to subsequent prosecution on a guilty plea that remained in effect during the
course of a criminal proceeding." Id.
172. Commonwealth v. Yerby, 679 A.2d 217, 218 (Pa. 1996).
173. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 218. Specifically, Yerby violated an order issued pursuant
to 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(b) (1995), (as amended) a provision of Pennsylvania's Protec-
tion From Abuse Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-6118 (1995). Id. A "protection
order" as used in this instance refers to an order issued in a domestic violence case to
protect a spouse and/or child from potential physical harm by the estranged spouse.
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1223 (6th ed. 1990).
830 Vol. 35:807
PA Recent Developments-Criminal Law
mitted during the November 1, 1992 event.174 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court upheld Yerby's convictions, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court accepted the case for review.
175
Yerby argued that his conviction for terroristic threats was
unconstitutional as it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 76 Specifi-
cally, Yerby contended the terroristic threats conviction was con-
stitutionally infirm because it involved substantially the same
offense as his criminal contempt conviction.
177
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially recognized the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Dixon 78 mandating the use of the test set forth in Blockburger v.
United States 79 in all double jeopardy cases.18 0  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court explained that the so-called "Block-
burger Test" requires two convictions to have at least one
separate element lest prosecution for the latter offense be in vio-
lation of double jeopardy.''
The court next considered Blockburger as applied to Yerby by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in reliance upon Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Dixon.S2 In Dixon, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist asserted that for Blockburger purposes, in criminal con-
tempt cases, the elements of the crime to be examined are those
of criminal contempt, not the elements of the crime underlying
the contempt. 8 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Yerby then
noted the superior court in that case accepted Justice Rehn-
quist's Dixon reasoning that in each double jeopardy case, the
174. Yerby, 672 A.2d at 218. In addition to terroristic threats, Yerby was convicted
of recklessly endangering another person, unlawful restraint and possession of an instru-
ment of crime. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in perti-
nent part: "No person shall... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Yerby only challenged his conviction with respect to the United States Constitu-
tion. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 218. The court thus explicitly limited its decision to the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and did not address Yerby's situation
under Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 219 n.3.
177. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 219.
178. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
179. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
180. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 219.
181. Id. The court stated: "[Uinless each of the two offenses for which the defend-
ant is punished or tried contains an element not contained in the other, they are the same
offenses and successive prosecution is barred." Id.
182. Id. at 220-22. The court noted that the Dixon court was severely fragmented,
resulting in a plurality decision. Id. at 200. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 690-91.
183. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 712. Justice Rehnquist stated: "In my view, Blockburger's
same-elements test requires us to focus, not on the terms of the particular court orders
involved, but on the elements of contempt of court in the ordinary sense." Id.
1997
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elements of the underlying offense are examined against the ele-
ments of criminal contempt. 8 4 Applying Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's approach, the superior court concluded the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Allen8 5 remained
valid legal precedent.
8 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the superior
court, however, and chose instead to apply an alternate interpre-
tation of Blockburger in Yerby.18 7 The court found it necessary to
examine the elements of the crime against the elements of the
offenses underlying the criminal contempt, an approach applied
by Justice Scalia in Dixon.'88 The court therefore overruled its
decision in Commonwealth v. Allen.8 9
Applying the new analysis to Yerby's convictions, the court
concluded that proof of the elements for a conviction of terroristic
threats is not necessary for a finding of criminal contempt. 19°
Thus, the court affirmed Yerby's conviction. 191
CRIMINAL LAw-OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE-Commonwealth v.
Delgado, 679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that a defendant's act of discarding drug evi-
dence in the plain view of a police officer while being pursued by
the police does not rise to the level of destroying or concealing
evidence within the meaning of a state obstruction of justice
statute.
184. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 220. In Dixon, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the ele-
ments of criminal contempt as: "(i) a court order made known to the defendant, followed
by (ii) willful violation of that order." Dixon, 509 U.S. at 716.
185. 486 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1984). In Allen, the court held dual convictions for criminal
contempt and simple assault did not violate double jeopardy despite the fact that the
convictions were based upon the same conduct by the defendant. Allen, 486 A.2d at 370.
186. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 220.
187. Id. The court found that the approach advocated by the superior court and
Chief Justice Rehnquist "renders double jeopardy protections illusory at best." Id.
188. Id. at 221. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691-713.
189. Yerby, 679 A.2d at 221. The court stated:
[Slince a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Dixon . . . failed to
embrace the analysis suggested by our court in Allen with respect to the applica-
tion of Blockburger, and explicitly rejected the reasoning and analysis of Allen with
respect to the vindication of the distinct interests involved, this court's decision
therein can no longer be deemed valid. Accordingly, that decision is hereby
overruled.
Id.
190. Id. at 223.
191. Id.
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In Commonwealth v. Delgado,92 members of the Lancaster
Bureau Police Department observed William Delgado meet with
a confidential police informant who had been instructed to
purchase drugs. 193  When the informant flagged the police
officers to indicate that a drug transaction had been made, the
police approached Delgado. 194 Delgado ran from the scene, and
while attempting to evade the officers who pursued him, tossed
an object on top of a small building.195 The object was recovered
by the police and later identified as a container of 17.1 grams of
cocaine. 196
A trial court found Delgado's act of discarding cocaine during
the police pursuit to constitute an intentional alteration of evi-
dence in violation of section 4910 of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code.'97 The superior court affirmed the trial court's finding on
appeal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently
granted allocatur in the case. 198
The supreme court reversed the superior court's decision, hold-
ing that Delgado was improperly convicted under section 4910 of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code because he cast aside the
container of cocaine at a time when the police could see him.199
The court reasoned that while discarding evidence under these
circumstances constitutes an "abandonment" of evidence, it does
not qualify as the type of intentional alteration of evidence
required under the "plain meaning" of section 4910.200
192. 679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996).
193. Delgado, 679 A.2d at 223. The Lancaster police were engaged in a drug investi-
gation and had provided the informant with money to purchase drugs in an area of town
noted for drug trafficking. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. One of the officers in pursuit witnessed the defendant discard this object.
Id. The defendant was eventually apprehended. Id. at 224
196. Id.
197. Id. at 224. This section of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code specifically provides
as follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent
to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4910(1) (1995).
198. Delgado, 679 A.2d at 224.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court stated that it reached this holding "mindful of the principles of
the construction for the Crimes Code," which set forth the following:
The provisions of [the Crimes Code] shall be construed according to the fair import
of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it
shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this title and the
special purposes of the particular provision involved.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 105 (1995); Delgado, 679 A.2d at 224.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Commonwealth v.
Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that contraband discarded by a person fleeing law
enforcement officers is the fruit of an illegal seizure when the law
enforcement officers had neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion to stop the person and conduct a "Terry Frisk."201
In Commonwealth v. Matos,20 2 two Philadelphia police officers
responded to a radio call regarding a drug sale.2 °3 When the
officers approached the scene, three men, including defendant
Matos, fled with the officers in pursuit.20 4 While chasing one of
the fleeing men, an officer witnessed him toss a plastic bag,
which contained what was later identified as twelve vials of
cocaine.20 5 The officer eventually arrested the man who dis-
carded the drugs." 8
The trial court suppressed the cocaine evidence as fruit of an
illegal search and seizure, but the Pennsylvania Superior Court
subsequently reversed this decision.20 7 On appeal, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found that under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, contraband discarded
during a police pursuit is not the fruit of an illegal seizure of the
person even when the pursuit is not based on reasonable suspi-
cion.2°s The court found, however, that Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater search and seizure
protection to its citizens than that given under the federal Con-
stitution.20 9 In so finding, the court undertook a four-pronged
analysis set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds210 for determin-
ing whether a particular state constitutional provision affords
more protection to an individual right than that afforded under
the federal Constitution.
211
201. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
202. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996).





208. Matos, 672 A.2d at 772-74. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In
Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court held that even if a police officer's pursuit is
not based on reasonable suspicion, any contraband discarded during the pursuit is not the
illegal fruit of a seizure of the person. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-29. The Court held that
an arrest of the person under the Fourth Amendment requires either physical force with
lawful authority or submission to the assertion of lawful authority. Id.
209. Matos, 672 A.2d at 772-74.
210. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
211. Matos, 672 A.2d at 773.
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Under the Edmunds test, the court found that although Arti-
cle I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is worded
almost identically to the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, its historical interpretation has been such
that it has provided greater search and seizure protection to
state citizens than that afforded under its federal counterpart.212
Additionally, the court acknowledged that several sister states
also provide greater protection from seizures under their state
constitutions as compared to the United States Constitution.213
Finally, the court reasoned that the policy of the Commonwealth
has always been that a person has no duty to stop or respond to a
police officer's inquiry "absent any level of suspicion" on the part
of the police officer.214
In conclusion, the court found that the police officer's conduct
in this case constituted a coercive factor in Matos' abandonment
of the contraband.21 Therefore, the court held that by chasing
Matos, the officer engaged in conduct constituting an illegal
seizure, and, thus, the discarded contraband was the fruit of such
216seizure.
IV. Taxation
TAXATION-REASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY-UNIFORMITY OF TAXA-
TION-City of Harrisburg v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment
App.-677 A.2d 350 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)-The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court held that Dauphin County's rehabilitated
property reassessments violated the uniformity of taxation
requirement under Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution and the equalization objective of the Third Class
County Assessment Act.
212. Id. at 773-75.
213. Id. at 775. The court cited the following cases arising out of other jurisdictions
in support of this proposition: State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992); State v.
Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992) cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1992); In Re E.D.J., 502
N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993); State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994); New York v. Madera,
580 N.Y.S.2d 984 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), afld, 596 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), affd
604 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Holmes 813 P.2d 28 (Or. 1991). Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 775.
216. Matos, 672 A.2d at 776.
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In 1985, Dauphin County (the "County") implemented a
county-wide property reassessment.217 Since the County was
certified as a Third Class County in 1981, it used a predeter-
mined ratio of 100% pursuant to the Third Class County Assess-
ment Act.218
In 1987 and 1988, the County reassessed rehabilitated prop-
erty in the City of Harrisburg (the "City"), which was the sole
municipality in the County where reassessment based on reha-
bilitation was conducted. 21 9 The properties were assessed by ini-
tially establishing the current market value in the year of
inspection (1987 or 1988), and then inserting the current market
value into a formula to arrive at a current reassessment even
though other unrehabilitated properties were still assessed
under a system using 1973 market values.220
Certain taxpayers, including owners of the reassessed proper-
ties, filed an action in 1990 seeking equitable and declaratory
relief.221 The taxpayers contended that the remodeling reassess-
ments violated the uniformity of taxation requirement set forth
in the Pennsylvania Constitution,222 and the 1985 reassessment
and 1987-88 reassessment plan violated the "equalization objec-
tive" of the Third Class County Assessment Act.223 Finally, the
taxpayers asserted that the County's implementation of the
217. City of Harrisburg v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment App., 677 A.2d 350,
352 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). In 1984, the County's "common level ratio" was only half of
the County's "predetermined ratio" of 30%, indicating that assessment values were only
half of the market values. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 352. The "common level ratio"
has been described as the percentage ratio of assessed value to current market value,
which is calculated on a yearly basis by the State Tax Equalization Board. Id. at 352 n.2.
(citing City of Harrisburg v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment App., 492 A.2d 793, 794
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)). Further, "predetermined ratio" has been described as "the ratio
that the County determines should exist between a property's assessed value and fair
market value." Id. (citing City of Harrisburg, 492 A.2d at 794).
218. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 352. Section 7(c) of the Third Class County
Assessment Act sets forth, in pertinent part: "The board shall assess real property at a
value based upon a predetermined ratio which may not exceed one hundred percent of
actual value." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5348(c) (West 1995).
219. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 352.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in relevant part: "All taxes shall be
uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." PA. CONsT. art. 8,
§ 1.
223. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 353. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5348(c)
(West 1995). According to the court, "[t]he objective of Section 7(d) is to reach an assess-
ment valuation that will accomplish equalization with other similar properties within the
taxing district." Id. at 353 n.4.
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1987-88 reassessments in the City violated section 402(a) of the
General County Assessment Law.224
The trial court found for the taxpayers and ordered a county-
wide reassessment.225 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court affirmed the trial court's decision and denied
the taxpayers' cross-appeal seeking taxpayer refunds, litigation
costs and attorney's fees.226
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that
the doctrine of laches 227 did not bar this equity action merely
because four years and five months had passed between the time
that notice of the 1985 reassessments was mailed and the tax-
payers' complaint.228 In reaching this decision, the court found
persuasive that the relief granted by the trial court was prospec-
tive in nature, the County was not ordered to pay refunds and
the local entities involved would not be unduly prejudiced by the
order of a county-wide reassessment. 229 Additionally, an exami-
nation of the record revealed that the taxpayers acted with due
diligence since they promptly challenged the 1987-88 interim
revisions of assessments to their property.230 Further, the court
noted that the 1985 reassessment contributed to a lack of uni-
formity not immediately apparent to the taxpayers, since the
County represented that the reassessment would lead to
equalization.231
The court dismissed the County's claim that the taxpayers
failed to raise a claim involving a substantial constitutional
question with no adequate remedy at law.232 The court con-
cluded that the taxpayers successfully raised the following signif-
icant constitutional question: "Whether the 1985 county-wide
assessment and the 1987-88 remodeling reassessments violate
224. Id. The General County Assessment Law "prohibits a county from levying any
real estate taxes under a county-wide revised assessment of real property until it has
been completed for the entire county." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 402(a) (West 1995).
225. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 353.
226. Id. at 356.
227. The court described the doctrine of laches as:
[B]arring relief when the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in
failing to promptly institute an action to the prejudice of another.... In order to
prevail on an assertion of laches, the responding party must establish: (1) a delay
arising from the petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence and (2) prejudice to
the respondents resulting from the delay. Moreover, the question of laches is a
factual one, and it is determined by examining the circumstances of each case....
The mere passage of time does not give rise to an automatic finding of laches.
City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 356 (citations omitted).
228. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 353.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 353-54.
232. Id.
1997 837
838 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 35:807
the uniformity of taxation requirement as set forth in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution." 3
In affirming the trial court's decision to order a county-wide
reassessment, the court noted that the record supported a find-
ing that both the 1985 reassessment and 1987-88 remodeling
reassessments violated the uniformity of taxation requirement
under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the equalization objec-
tive of the Third Class County Assessment Law.234 Finally, the
court concluded that the trial court did not err in ordering the
roll back of the 1987-88 reassessments. 2 5 According to the
supreme court, these reassessments indeed constituted a "de
facto" county-wide reassessment and, thus, also violated the uni-
formity of taxation requirement under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution and the equalization objective of the Third Class County
lw236law.
V. Workers' Compensation Law
WORKERS' COMPENSATION-PSYCHIC INJURY-Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 675
233. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 354. See supra note 222 and accompanying
text for the relevant constitutional text. In considering this issue, the court also dis-
cussed Lancaster v. Lancaster, 599 A.2d 903 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), a factually similar
case in which the commonwealth court accepted the plaintiff taxpayers' assertion of no
adequate remedy at law where an inequality caused by a partial reassessment program
affected the entire taxing scheme. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 354.
234. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 354. The court noted that expert testimony at
trial established the following:
[Tlhe 1985 reassessment did not take into account the fact that different land uses
appreciate at different rates. Commercial and industrial properties do not appreci-
ate faster than less expensive properties. As a result, different land uses have dif-
ferent common level ratios. Instead of examining the common level ratios for each
land use to determine appreciation, the County simply doubled the assessments of
all properties regardless of whether they were residential, commercial/industrial,
or farm properties. The lack of uniformity throughout the County was aggravated,
and some property owners pay more than their fair share of taxes while others pay
less.... [Further], the 1987-1988 remodeling reassessments also aggravated the
lack of uniformity by using a "mixed methodology" approach to reassessing the
rehabilitated properties. The County, while utilizing a 1973 base year system,
inserted 1987 remodeling sales figures comparisons as a factor in reassessing the
rehabilitated properties. Using 1987 valuations rather than 1973 valuations, the
remodeled properties cannot be equalized with existing properties based on the




236. Id. The court also pointed out the trial court's finding that the 1987-88 reas-
sessments were completed in "such an arbitrary and careless manner, so as to be ren-
dered invalid on that basis alone." Id.
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A.2d 1213 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
that one occurrence of criticism by an employer of an employee,
even when it involves the use of obscenities, does not constitute a
compensable psychic injury for purposes of workers'
compensation.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
App. Bd. ,7 Andrew Guaracino worked as a truck driver and dis-
tributed newspapers for the Philadelphia Daily News.23 8 Early
in his truck route on May 1, 1990, Guaracino lost a parcel of
newspapers that he was required to deliver.239 Later that day,
two of Guaracino's supervisors met with him at two of his sched-
uled stops and reprimanded Guaracino for losing the newspapers
and for other job related matters.240 Both supervisors called
Guaracino obscene names and cursed him during these confron-
tations."' Guaracino subsequently left the job site, claiming he
was too emotionally and physically upset to work.1 2 Following
that day, Guaracino never went back to his job.24
On June 26, 1990, Guaracino filed a claim for workers' com-
pensation, asserting that he suffered a compensable psychic
injury as a result of the events on May 1, 1990.1 4 Although a
workers' compensation judge found Guaracino's claim valid, the
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board later denied his peti-
tion.2 5 On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed, finding
that criticism of an employee that encompasses vulgarity consti-
tutes an "abnormal working condition" worthy of psychic injury
benefits even if the criticism occurs only once. 246
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that one
occurrence of admonition and insulting or obscene behavior by a
237. 675 A.2d 1213 (Pa. 1996).
238. Philadelphia Newspapers, 675 A.2d at 1214.
239. Id. at 1215. The newspapers had flown out the back of Guaracino's truck after
he neglected to close the truck door. Id.
240. Id. The supervisors confronted Guaracino about whether he had been persuad-
ing other drivers to solicit the company for unnecessary overtime pay. Id.
241. Id. at 1216.
242. Id. at 1215. Guaracino stated that he was "a nervous wreck" and "dizzy." Id.
243. Philadelphia Newspapers, 675 A.2d at 1216.
244. Id. at 1214. Guaracino claimed that "voices" told him to "get them" and "go get
even" following the confrontations. Id. at 1216. Guaracino's wife stated that their mari-
tal relation suffered and that Guaracino no longer paid attention to their daughter. Id.
245. Id. at 1215.
246. Id. at 1218. The commonwealth court stated: "Verbal abuse by a supervisor
intended to harass, degrade, intimidate or belittle is a traumatic experience and should
not occur in the everyday workplace." Guaracino v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd.,
652 A.2d 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
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supervisor towards an employee is insufficient to constitute a
compensable psychic injury for workers' compensation pur-
poses.247 The court found that according to Martin v. Ketchum,248
a workers' compensation claimant must establish that he or she
suffered psychic injuries pursuant to an abnormal working condi-
tion.2 9 The court then reasoned that an abnormal working con-
dition cannot be comprised of a single reprehensible event
because as a "microcosm of society," a place of employment is
realistically comprised of people who might engage in offensive
behaviors.25 °  In conclusion, therefore, the supreme court
reversed the holding of the commonwealth court and denied
Guaracino workers' compensation benefits since his benefits
claim rested on an isolated offensive incident.25'
WORKERS' COMPENSATION-PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS-
OVERTIME COMPENSATION-Harper & Collins v. Workers' Com-
pensation App. Bd. (BROWN), 672 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 1996)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an injured worker who
returns to a light duty position at the same hourly rate as the
worker's pre-injury position is entitled to partial disability bene-
fits when the worker continues to earn less than his or her aver-
age weekly wage because of a lack of available overtime hours.
In Harper & Collins v. Workers' Compensation App. Bd.
(Brown),25 2 Rachael Brown ("Brown") suffered a work-related
injury in August of 1991 and began receiving total disability ben-
efits pursuant to an agreement with her employer.253 In March
of 1992, Brown returned to work in a light duty position paying
247. Philadelphia Newspapers, 675 A.2d at 1218.
248. 568 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1990).
249. Philadelphia Newspapers, 675 A.2d at 1218, 1219.
250. Id. at 1219. The supreme court specifically stated:
In assessing whether work conditions are abnormal, we must recognize that the
work environment is a microcosm of society. It is not a shelter from rude behavior,
obscene language, incivility or stress. While we do not suggest that insensitive
behavior is socially acceptable in the work place, it is unrealistic to expect that
such behavior will not occur.
Id.
251. Id. at 1220. The court rejected Mr. Guaracino's argument that the instant
holding will result in an increase of employer harassment. Id.
252. 672 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 1996).
253. Harper & Collins (Brown), 672 A.2d at 1319. Brown began receiving weekly
benefits pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable in the amount of $427.12 based
upon an average weekly wage of $640.68. Id. at 1319. Generally, workers' compensation
payments are made pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable when there is no ini-
tial dispute between the parties as to the injury sustained by the worker. Id.
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the same hourly wage as her pre-injury position.2 54 At the same
time, Brown submitted to a suspension of compensation benefits
pending a new determination of her average weekly wage.
255
Brown later filed a Petition for Review to recoup wages lost due
to the unavailability of overtime hours.256 Importantly, the par-
ties stipulated that the lack of overtime hours was due to unfa-
vorable economic conditions.257
The workers' compensation judge concluded Brown was enti-
tled to partial disability benefits, and the Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeal Board affirmed the judge's decision.258 On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court also affirmed the deci-
sion of the workers' compensation judge and the case was subse-
quently presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.259
Initially, the supreme court considered whether including an
injured employee's overtime wages in a computation of that
employee's average weekly wage is proper.260 The court con-
cluded that the plain language of the Workers' Compensation Act
provides for inclusion of overtime wages in the calculation of an
injured worker's average weekly wage. 261 Having resolved this
threshold question, the court next considered whether overtime
wages lost due to an economic downturn at the worker's place of
employment are properly included in the worker's average
weekly wage computation and are thus compensable if not
received.262
The court acknowledged the long-standing principle that an
employee whose benefits are merely suspended need only demon-
strate a continued (or recurring) loss of earnings to become enti-
254. Id. at 1320.
255. Id.
256. Id. The computation of Brown's pre-injury average weekly wage was higher
than her weekly wage upon her return to the light duty position because she consistently
received overtime prior to her injury. Id. Brown contended that she was entitled to par-
tial disability benefits to recover the difference between her pre-injury and post-injury
wages. Id.
257. Id.
258. Harper & Collins (Brown), 672 A.2d at 1320. As a result of the decision in her
favor, Brown became entitled to a percentage of the difference between her pre-injury and
post-injury wages despite her return to a light duty position at her pre-injury hourly rate.
Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1321-22. The court stated that the relevant portion of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 582 (West 1992), amended by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 582 (West Supp. 1997), provides for the inclusion of an employee's "total wages
at the time of injury." Id. at 1322.
261. Id. at 1322.
262. Id. at 1322-23.
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tled to benefits. 263 The court then concluded Brown's continued
loss of earnings from overtime pay entitled her to partial disabil-
ity benefits despite the fact that the loss of overtime was due to
economic conditions at the workplace.264 Further, the court held
that an employer's economic decisions have absolutely no impact
upon calculation of a worker's average weekly wage. 26 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Castille argued that an award
of benefits to a worker where the economic loss is not occasioned
by the work-related injury is improper. 26 Justice Castille con-
cluded in this case, therefore, that Brown was not entitled to par-
tial disability benefits as her loss of overtime pay was occasioned
by her employer's financial situation and not her work injury.26 7
VI. Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES-EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS-Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1996)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Special Investigator in
the Office of Inspector General does not have a personal property
right in his employment entitling him to an administrative hear-
ing prior to discharge.
In Werner v. Zazyczny, 28s Daniel H. Werner, Jr. ("Werner"), a
Special Investigator in the Office of Inspector General ("OIG"),
was on a paid work-related disability leave from his position
when he was arrested in connection with a domestic dispute with
his wife.269 The Inspector General of the Commonwealth
informed Werner shortly after his arrest that he was suspended
263. Harper & Collins (Brown), 672 A.2d at 1323. The court cited Pieper v. Ametek-
Thermox Instruments Div., 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990) for this general principle; however, it
acknowledged that Pieper was not directly analogous to the present case. Id.
264. Id. at 1322. The court also cited the commonwealth court's decision in
McGraw-Edison v. W.C.A.B.(Ardeno), 547 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) as instruc-
tive. Id.
265. Id. at 1323. The court further stated that its conclusion was intended, in part,
to provide continued incentive for injured workers to return to the work force. Id. at
1323-24.
266. Id. at 1324 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille cited Inglis House v.
W.C.AB., 634 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1993) as controlling precedent with respect to this issue. Id.
267. Id.
268. 681 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1996).
269. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1334. Werner was arrested and charged with aggravated
indecent assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person and terroristic
threats. Id.
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without pay until further notice, and that the OIG would conduct
an investigation into the matter.2 70 All charges against Werner
were eventually dropped, but Werner's suspension continued
until the OIG investigation was completed.271 Werner was later
notified by letter that he was dismissed from his position as a
result of the OIG Investigation findings.272
Werner requested an administrative hearing to be held
regarding his dismissal, but the OIG denied the request.273 Wer-
ner then filed a Petition for Review with the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court in which he sought a writ of mandamus274 to
compel either his return to the Special Investigator Position or a
post-discharge hearing.275 The OIG filed preliminary objections
and a motion to quash Werner's Petition for Review.276 The com-
monwealth court sustained the preliminary objections and dis-
missed Werner's petition, holding that Werner had no right to an
administrative hearing as an at-will employee under section 504
of the Administrative Agency Law.277 Werner's subsequent
Application for Reargument filed with the commonwealth court
was denied.278
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first addressed
whether Werner was entitled to a hearing on his discharge under
section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law.2 79  The court
found that Werner would only be entitled to a hearing if his dis-
270. Id. Werner's suspension was in accordance with the Governor's Code of Con-
duct for Appointed Officials and State Employees Criminal Charges. Id. The pertinent
provision of this Code provides:
As soon as practicable after an employee has been formally charged with criminal
conduct related to his employment with the Commonwealth or which constitutes a
felony, the employee shall be suspended without pay.
If the charge results in conviction in a court of law, the employee shall be
terminated.
4 PA. CODE § 7.173 (1997).
271. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1334.
272. Id. The letter stated that the dismissal was justified based on the OIG's deter-
mination that Werner's actions "discredited and embarrassed the OIG and caused the
OIG to lose the necessary trust and confidence in [Werner] that was required for the
Special Investigator position." Id.
273. Id.
274. A writ of mandamus is a writ issued from a court of superior jurisdiction
directing an executive, administrative or judicial officer to perform a duty imposed by
law. BLAcK's LAw DicnONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
275. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1334-35.
276. Id. at 1335.
277. Id. Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law provides: "No adjudication
of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been
afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard." 2 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 504 (1988).
278. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1335.
279. Id.
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missal constituted an "adjudication."2s0 Werner's dismissal
would constitute an adjudication under section 504 only if it
affected a "personal or property right, privilege or immunity."
28 '
In this case, the court held, no statute or contract existed guar-
anteeing employment for non-union, non-civil service employees
such as Werner. 282 As a result, Werner had no personal or prop-
erty right in his OIG position and was not entitled to an adminis-
trative hearing as to his discharge.
283
The court next addressed Werner's contention that the Gover-
nor's Code of Conduct creates an expectation of continued
employment.2 4 The court rejected this claim, holding that the
Governor's Code of Conduct is not a statute but an executive
order codified in the Pennsylvania Code.28 5 Since this executive
order was neither authorized by the Pennsylvania Constitution
nor promulgated pursuant to a statute, it does not have the force
of law necessary to create a personal or property right in contin-
ued employment.2
6
The court also rejected Werner's contention that Article VI,
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution creates a property
interest in continued employment.28 7 The court then held that
even if Article VI, Section 7 does create such a property right, it
does not apply to Werner because it only applies to appointed
civil or public officers. 88 Since Werner's position did not involve
duties of a "grave and important character" regarding a govern-
ment function, he was not a civil or public officer subject to the
Pennsylvania Constitution.289
Werner also argued that he was entitled to an administrative
hearing since public employment is a personal privilege. 290 The
280. Id. at 1336. See supra note 277 for the text of section 504.
281. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1336.
282. Id. The court held that only a governmental employee evidencing an expecta-
tion of continued employment based on a contract or statute has a personal or property
right in employment. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. The Governor's Code of Conduct was promulgated through Executive
Order 1980-18. Id.
286. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1336. The governor may issue executive orders without
express constitutional or statutory authority, but these orders will not be enforced by the
courts. Id.
287. Id. at 1337. Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
that "appointed civil or public officers may be removed at the pleasure of the power by
which they shall be appointed." PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. Werner contended that since he
was dismissed by someone other than his appointed authority, a property right in contin-
ued employment was implied. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1337.
288. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1337.
289. Id. at 1338.
290. Id.
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court dismissed this argument as well, holding that Werner
failed to plead facts supporting the contention that his interest in
continued employment as a Special Investigator constituted a
privilege.
291
Finally, the supreme court addressed Werner's contention that
he should have been granted leave to amend his Petition for
Review once the OIG's preliminary objections were sustained by
the commonwealth court.292 The court rejected this claim since
Werner never requested the commonwealth court to allow him to
amend his petition and the court was not required sua sponte
293
to order him to amend the pleading.294 In conclusion, therefore,
the court found Werner did not have a right to a post-dismissal
hearing under Administrative Agency Law.295
VII. Statutory Law
STATUTORY LAw-RIGHT TO KNOW ACT-APPLICATION TO PUBLIC
AGENCIES-Community College of Philadelphia v. Brown, 674
A.2d 60 (Pa. 1996)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
community colleges are not subject to the Right to Know Act
since they are not "agencies" within the meaning of the act.
In Community College of Philadelphia v. Brown,296 the editors
of a student newspaper ("Brown") requested the Community Col-
lege of Philadelphia (the "college") to release certain documents
regarding campus security pursuant to the Right to Know Act. 9 7
291. Id.
292. Id. Werner asserted that if he had been allowed to amend his petition, he
would have been able to plead the necessary facts establishing that his interest in contin-
ued employment constituted a privilege. Id.
293. A court acting sua sponte is acting on its own will or motion. BLAcK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990).
294. Werner, 681 A.2d at 1338.
295. Id.
296. 674 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1996).
297. Community College, 674 A.2d at 671. Public records of public agencies are
subject to the Right to Know Act, which is codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (West
1959). The Act defines a public agency as:
Any department, board or commission of the executive branch of the Common-
wealth, any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Turn-
pike Commission, or any State or municipal authority or similar organization
created by or pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that such organiza-
tion performs or has for its purpose the performance of an essential governmental
function.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (West 1959).
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When the college refused to disclose the documents, Brown
appealed the decision to the court of common pleas.29 The col-
lege filed a motion to quash299 the appeal on the basis that it was
not subject to the Right to Know Act. °0
The common pleas court held that the college was not an
"agency" as defined by the Act and quashed the appeal.3 0 1 The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court subsequently reversed the
decision by the court of common pleas, holding that the college
was an agency within the meaning of the Right to Know Act and
therefore subject to the Act's provisions. 0 2 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court then granted allocatur303 to address whether the
college was required to comply with the terms of the Right to
Know Act.304
The supreme court began its analysis by stating that the
intent of the Right to Know Act is to ensure the right of citizens
to examine and inspect the public records of public agencies.
30 5
The court then determined that the college would only fall within
the Act's definition of agency if it performed an essential govern-
mental function. 06 According to the court, a community college
may be considered to be performing a governmental function in
three possible ways: (1) if the college is statutorily identified as
providing essential services; (2) if the college provides a constitu-
tionally mandated service; or (3) if the college provides a service
indisputably necessary to the continued existence of the
Commonwealth.30 7
Applying the three criteria to the College, the court summarily
rejected the first criterion's applicability since community col-
298. Community College, 674 A.2d at 670.
299. A motion to quash is a motion to vacate, abate or annul. BLAcK's LAW DICTION-
ARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990).
300. Community College, 674 A.2d at 671.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Allocatur is a word denoting that a writ or order is allowed. BLAces LAw Dic-
TIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
304. Community College, 674 A.2d at 671. The court noted the college's assertion
that the commonwealth court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Brown failed
to properly assert jurisdiction. Id. Brown did request, however, that the supreme court
issue an opinion on the substantive issues presented in the case. Id. The court held that
the commonwealth court did have jurisdiction over the matter, however, pursuant to 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 762 (a)(4)(iXA) (1995). Id.
305. Id. The only public records exempt from examination and inspection under the
Act are those that disclose the institution, progress or result of an official investigation.
Id. The court noted that because of its disposition of the case, it was not required to
address whether the documents involved in this case were "public records" as defined by
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leges were never statutorily identified as providers of essential
services.10' The court also rejected the applicability of the sec-
ond criterion, stating that since the legislature is not constitu-
tionally required to provide public education beyond the primary
and secondary level, there is no constitutional mandate for the
services of community colleges. 3 9 Finally, the court found the
third criterion not applicable to the case, because even though
community colleges provide important educational services,
these services are not essential to the survival of the Common-
wealth.310 In conclusion, therefore, the court held that the col-
lege is not required to comply with the terms of the Right to
Know Act since it is not an "agency" as defined by the Act.
31'
308. Id.
309. Community College, 674 A.2d at 671.
310. Id. at 672. The court relied on the definition of "essential" provided by Black's
Law Dictionary to make this determination. Id. This dictionary defines "essential" as
"indispensably necessary; important in the highest degree." BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY
546 (6th ed. 1990).
311. Community College, 674 A.2d at 671.
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